We need a history of truth--though until now no one has tried to write one. We need it to test the claim that truth is just a name for opinions--produced and reproduced--that suit the demands of society or the convenience of elites. We need to be able to tell whether truth is changeable or eternal, embedded in time or outside it, universal or varying from place to place.
We need to know how we have got to where we are in the history of truth--how our society has come to lose faith in the reality of it and lose interest in the search for it. We need a history of truth to illuminate the unique predicament of our times and, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto argues, to help us escape from it.
Fernandez-Armesto shows how--at different times, in different societies--people have tried to distinguish truth from falsehood; he also exposes the basic human assumptions about truth that have informed and determined these truth-telling strategies. All truth-finding can be reduced, he argues, to a few basic types, which have always been available, but which have been combined in varying proportions. These types are still useful. They can help us survive contemporary uncertainty and rebuild life after doubt.
This little book takes on an enormous subject and makes it understandable to anyone. It's a work of unusual audacity and tremendous scope; it is short, clear, readable, opinionated--but uncompromising in raising big issues, using rich language, and embracing a vast range. It leaps from truth-telling technologies of earlier societies to the private mental worlds of great philosophers, from the building of the pyramids to cubist art, from spiritualism to science, and from New York to New Guinea.
Review
But Western philosophy after Descartes, in Fernández-Armesto's assessment, has been largely hostile to these ways of knowledge, and has steadily come to question the very existence of truth. His summation of post-Cartesian philosophy is a largely negative one, which veers dangerously close to ad hominem assaults. Nietzsche, for example, who "was praised too much in his youth for his superior powers of mind and never achieved prowess or position to match", is dismissed as "a sexually inexperienced invalid" whose philosophy was "warped and mangled out of his own lonely, sickly self-hatred". Pragmatism and existentialism, two of the 20th century's most important philosophical movements, are found inadequate: the former is "the philosophy of lovers of technology"; while the latter "represents the retreat of Luddites and pessimists into the security of self-contemplation". But even though "philosophical subjectivism, scientific uncertainties, and dumbing, numbing linguistics" have served to undermine the notion of truth, Fernández-Armesto believes, they cannot destroy it thoroughly. It seems that even in the face of relativism, truth will win out. --Christine Buttery --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.